

LAND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT UNDER A TREE CROPPING SYSTEM: THE CASE OF *Theobroma cacao* IN SOUTHWESTERN NIGERIA

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I. INTRODUCTION

General observation and systematic research have consistently indicated that a sizeable portion of farmlands within the cacao growing communities of southwestern Nigeria is tenant-operated. This article will focus primarily on a specific study area within Southwestern Nigeria. Within the study area, the cultivation of cacao, mainly for export, is of primary importance to the farmers. Economic and social activities revolve around the crop with annual festivals and ceremonies held during the periods immediately after the annual sale of the crop. Until 1985, the study area produced about 40% of total *Theobroma cacao* (cacao) output for southwestern Nigeria. This share has continued to decline as a result of recurring land conflicts and the dislocation of a large number of migrant farmers. Past conflicts within the study area had often resulted in the abandonment of cacao plantations and its attendant decline in total output of the crop.

The leasing arrangement is the key feature in any landowner-tenant relationship.¹ This involves a contract by which the landowner conveys his right of use and possession to the tenant. Most of these land grants require payments of annual rents or tributes in cash or kind (usually measured weights of dry cacao beans). The lease agreement may be oral or written and may be limited to short periods of time.

The introduction of a national land policy as contained in the Land Use Act of 1978, however, brought disequilibrium into the former balance of rights and privileges enjoyed by tenants and landowners in the cacao-growing region. For example, the Act failed to recognize the continued existence of customary tenancy, both a key feature of customary land tenure and a *de facto* recognition of the ownership rights of landlords by the tenant farmers.

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¹ R. BARLOWE, *LAND RESOURCE ECONOMICS* 471, 477 (3rd ed. 1978).

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Consequently, a number of the tenants refused to honour their customary obligations concerning rent payment to their landlords.

This paper attempts to analyze the economic, social, and cultural issues involved in the management of land-related conflicts capable of diverting resources from cacao production for which the region is noted. This paper also suggests policy options capable of solving some of the observed problems caused by land conflicts within the region.

II. LAND CONFLICT GENERATION AND RESOLUTION

People's access to land rights constitutes the basic building block for the livelihood and sustenance of individuals, families and communities, especially in agrarian societies. Customary rights, formal state laws, or some combination of both may govern such access to land.

Land reform programs bring about changes in social power balances, rules and norms, as well as institutional structures; and, as such, they tend to provide regulation to some societies, while creating sources of conflicts for others. However, it needs to be stressed that with or without land reform, tension and conflict are a part of every society when the issue of land security is concerned. Erosion of land security is a source of human grievance that can contribute to land conflicts.

Approaches to land conflict resolution are many. All societies have a framework of laid-down conventions or rules by which land conflicts are managed or resolved.² The body of rules that defines and qualifies people's relationships on land with each other forms the land law of the people. The basic sets of standards from which other standards in the culture derive then become the framework of conflict management and resolution. In traditional societies, the approaches to conflict resolution are intrinsically bound up with the values of the people. The various concepts of land (spiritual, legal, political, economic, social, etc.) influence the land conflict resolution approaches adopted. The roles of the family and kinship institutions are everywhere held to be fundamental to land conflict resolution.³

² D. OYESHOLA, *CONFLICT AND CONTEXT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION* 12 (2005).

³ *Id.* at 13.

The domain of public resolution has been dominated by many researchers.⁴ It is now recognized that most modern mechanisms used to deal with public disputes – science, courts' administration and the legislature – have all proved unsatisfactory in many local and international conflict resolutions. Dispute settlements imposed upon parties or negotiated within the “shadow of the law” may not remove the real sources of the dispute.⁵ The adversarial nature of many of these processes may actually disrupt relationships rather than solving the problem. The intimidating size of formal courts, the expense, and the corrupt nature of the legal system often result in people seeking alternative means of resolving their conflicts.

III. ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS UNDER FARMLAND TENANCY

Land conflicts are the most evident social manifestations of land insecurity. The nature of such insecurity often remains undefined, but may also appear in the form of latent tensions or social dependency, institutional or legal uncertainties, or economic difficulties. A variety of factors and rules inherent in land ownership and use may contribute to insecurity, including geographical boundaries of land held by neighbouring units or communities, right of way and water access corridors, the nature of rights to a piece of land, the costs and socio-economic scope of those rights, their stability and levels of validation, and effective recognition of ownership and use rights in the framework of conflict resolution.

Institutions, local rules, and procedures governing the possession and exercise of land rights develop in reaction to specific situations, and not vice-versa. Consequently, it is not a matter of simply knowing these norms, but also of knowing their limits, distinguishing between what are official procedures, what are accepted and effective practices and rules, and what are not. Land conflicts thus appear both as significant diagnostic symptoms and as a vehicle of innovation enabling us to understand the evolution in systems of resource management.

⁴ See generally, V. JABRI, *MEDIATING CONFLICT* (1990); L. SUSSKIND & J., *CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES* (1987); B. GRAY, *COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND IN MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS* (1989); C. CARLSON, *Let's Reinvent "Mediating Institutions,"* NAT'L CIVIC REV., Fall 1999, at 207-10; J.J. WALL, J. STARK and STANDIFER, *Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development*, J. CONFLICT RESOL., June 2001, at 370-91; OYESHOLA, *supra* note 2.

⁵ OYESHOLA, *supra* note 2.

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The distribution of benefits depends on institutions and rules, which may be customary or legal, that affect the division of inherited land or the shares of landlords and tenants in a sharecropping arrangement. Some acceptance of institutionally mediated outcomes is essential if transactions are to be cost-effective and reliable. But, unless institutions can change under pressure, a society's outcomes are "frozen" in the interest of the existing controllers of the land tenure institutions. This favors the rural poor if they control the institutions, or at least can compel attention to their needs from those who do.

The idea that customary tenure rules necessarily imply insecurity does not square with huge historic investments in tree crops, including cacao.⁶ Achieving security of tenure is regarded as a necessary condition for investment. Ultimately, a person's rights to use land are no stronger than the recognition given to those rights by others. Legislative interventions, including nationalization, are not automatically observed where they conflict with customary practice in rural areas.⁷ The benefits of land titling have been found to be inconclusive in developing countries, implying that land sale and the rental market should be made more efficient and accessible to the poor. This underlies the fact that customary land tenure is based on continuing negotiations between interested stakeholders, one of which is the state.⁸ It is necessary, therefore, to be realistic about what can be achieved by legislative land reform.

IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CACAO PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA

Cacao cultivation was introduced into Western Nigeria towards the end of the 19th Century and, by the 1930s, the level of economic activities throughout the region generally rose and fell with the world price of cacao.⁹

⁶ M. MORTIMERE & Y.L. FABIYI, DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV. IN NIG., *COMPETITIVENESS AND GROWTH – THE IMPACT OF LAND POLICY* (2003).

⁷ H. LO & M. DIONE, *Region de Diourbel: Evolution des Regimes Fancier, in 19 DRYLANDS RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1, 3* (2000).

⁸ K. JUUL AND C.E. LUND, *NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA* (2002).

⁹ E.O. Idowu, *The Political Economy of Cocoa Production and Marketing in Nigeria: A Case Study of Ondo State* (1986) (unpublished M.Phil. thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria) (on file with author) [hereinafter Idowu, *Political Economy*].

The contribution of cacao to the Nigerian economy is very significant. Cacao seed and its products have consistently remained the dominant agricultural foreign exchange earner for Nigeria, next to petroleum, representing about 38% of total non-oil exports between 1993 and 2003. In monetary terms, export of cacao products generated an average of \$141 million annually in foreign exchange during that period.¹⁰ Increased production of the crop is essential for the diversification of the country's economy. However, past land conflicts have led to the dislocation of resources (notably labour and land) within the cacao belt of southwestern Nigeria.

Most of the past socio-economic studies on cacao production in Nigeria emphasized the effect of economic factors while neglecting the land problems.¹¹ Long-term access to land for cultivation is very crucial to cacao's production decisions. For example, adverse land access situations, including a crisis, could negatively affect cacao production. Being a tree crop that requires highly technical agronomic practices (such as applying insecticides, fungicides, weeding and pollination), disruption caused by local or regional crises affects cacao production levels for many years as rehabilitation efforts may take many months to complete.

V. METHODOLOGY

A. Description of Research Sites

This study was conducted within the cacao-growing communities around Ile-Ife, a mid-sized city in southwestern Nigeria. The area consists of about thirty settlements, or communities, scattered around the ancient city of Ile-Ife (the acclaimed cradle of the Yoruba race). This is an area that has recorded one of the highest influxes of migrant farm workers during the 1960s in search of good soil for cacao cultivation. Others had also moved in as farm labourers.¹²

¹⁰ CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORTS AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS (2003).

¹¹ See generally, Idowu, *Political Economy*, *supra* note 9; E.O. Idowu, *The Cocoa Industry and Employment Generation in Nigeria: The Case of Ondo State*, in EMPLOYMENT GENERATION IN NIGERIA (Fabiya, et. al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Idowu, *Cocoa Industry*]; T. Alimi and B. Awoyomi, *Impact of Structural Adjusted Programme on Cocoa Farming*, 2 IFE J. of Econ. and Fin. 95, 107 (1995); A. Kulepa, *The Effect of Foreign Exchange and Market Liberalism on the Production and Marketing of Cocoa in Nigeria* (2000) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria) (on file with author).

¹² S.A. AGBOOLA, AN AGRICULTURAL ATLAS OF NIGERIA (1979).

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Forest vegetation and a rainfall of about 1600mm per year characterize the climate. It lies within latitude 7° 30'N and longitude 5° E. The soil contains iron oxides. It is tropical with a sandy surface horizon underlain by a weakly developed clayey sub-soil horizon.¹³ The soil is generally considered to be of high natural fertility and suitable for cacao production.

The area has been noted for series of land tenure-related disturbances in the past. As of 1991, the estimated population stood at about 403,282, with a population density of about 320 people per square kilometer.^{14, 15}

B. Survey Methodology and Data Collection Procedure

A total of 198 respondents from eleven cacao-farming communities within the area were randomly selected to be interviewed. Information on the locations and sizes of the communities was obtained from the Local Government Offices and Departments Of Rural Development. Since most of these settlements consist of between 7 and 26 households, all the farmers, both landowners and tenants, were interviewed via questionnaire guides.

Visits were made to each field owned or farmed by those interviewed to make notes on physical characteristics of the fields, their approximate sizes, presence of crops, levels of maintenance or improvements, tenure portfolio, and use of farmlands by owner and migrant cacao farmers within the area of study. Also, the head chiefs of these villages and absentee landowners not resident in the villages were interviewed. In addition, the Customary and Magistrate Court Judges in towns with legal jurisdictions over the study area were consulted together with their court records for cases connected with land and other tenure-related issues. The data collected was analysed through the use of descriptive statistics and inferential statistics such as t-test of significance between two means.

¹³ F.A.O., *AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: 1965-1980* (1966).

¹⁴ NIGERIA, *NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION*, 1992).

¹⁵ A new census has just been conducted in Nigeria in March 2006 and the results are being awaited.

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

A. Immigrant Status of Respondents

Migrant farmers from outside the study area also undertake cacao production. They constitute about three-quarters of the farming population. The farmers moved into the study area about 40 years ago in search of fertile lands suitable for cultivating cacao. Appreciable levels of integration with the host communities were observed. About 80% have built houses in the host communities, while intermarriages have taken place between migrant farmers and their hosts. Most of the current migrant farmers are now the second generation of the original migrants.

Women migrants, or household heads, were not identified since cacao is not regarded a woman's crop. Women are not directly involved in seeking lands for cacao production, but only work on their spouses' plantations or cultivate small plots of staple food crops for family consumption.

B. Plot Characteristics

A plot has been defined as a contiguous piece of farmland in a location that has not been subdivided under the customary system of farm inheritance prevailing in the area. The average size of a migrant's farm was 3.5 hectares. Both migrants and landowners cultivated a total of 471 farm plots devoted to cacao, with an overall mean of 2.4 farm plots per farmer (See Table 1). In 78% of the cases, this average was unevenly distributed over about 2 to 3 locations, each obtained from different landowners. The sizes of each farm plot varied according to the amount of land available from the different landowners.

Landowners, on the other hand, cultivated many farm plots (about 4 to 6), but with significantly lower total farm sizes (2.4 hectares) than migrant farmers (3.5 hectares). The purpose of this land distribution was to be as close as possible to the migrant farmers to monitor their activities and prevent unwholesome behaviours.

Other crops grown on the farmland with cacao include kola nuts (*Cola spp.*), plantain (*Musa spp.*), staple food crops for home consumption, and wild grooves of oil palm trees (*Elaeis guinensis*) for oil and wine production.

C. Access to Farmlands

The type of access gained to farmland determines the quantum of usufruct rights enjoyed by the cultivator. Secondary types of access to plots, such as gift, rent, sharecropping, borrowing, and pledging, represented approximately 47% of the number of farmlands covered by the study. Primary types of access, such as inheritance and purchase, made up the rest of the farmlands (See Table 2). While secondary types of access are generally believed to retain some forms of restrictions with respect to planting of trees, the migrant farmers were not prevented from planting economic crops like cacao. This was because the major objective for seeking access to the farmlands was for cacao cultivation. Food crops are raised only on portions of the land not suitable for cacao production. About 60% of the respondents that reported inheritance as their mode of access were the second generation of migrants, but their farmlands still remain under the secondary access originally farmed by the first generation migrants.

D. Tenancy Arrangements¹⁶

Farmland tenancy with respect to cacao production is very important throughout southwestern Nigeria. In the past, tributes¹⁷ were paid by migrant farmers under secondary types of access. The tributes bore no relationship to either the size or productivity of the farmlands, or then-current economic realities. Amounts paid ranged from N800 to N1000 (about U.S. \$6.00 – U.S. \$7.50 at the time of the study). The amount of rent payable and the length of contract were not stated in the lease agreements in about 97% of the cases (See Table 3). This lack of specificity was a fundamental flaw, and the lack of legally binding agreements on rental payments constituted the major remote cause of land disputes between landowners and migrants in the area before the introduction of the Land Use Act. Recently renegotiated leases, however, contain economically determined rental payments in monetary terms. The political underpinnings only led to serious aggravation of the situation, resulting in communal conflicts.

¹⁶ FIELD STUDY, 2005.

¹⁷ Payments made for use of land but not determined economically as opposed to rent that is determined economically.

Different conditions obtained on farm plots under sharecropping, which was reported on only 1.7% of the farm plots (See Table 2). These were plots planted by the landowners but later given to migrant farmers to maintain, harvest and process the produce. The migrant (tenant) farmers retain two-thirds of the produce while the farm owners take one-third. However the migrant farmers provided all the inputs needed on the farm (fungicides, insecticide, fertilizers, labor etc.). Contracts under sharecropping were renewed every 2-3 years in a majority of the cases. Due to regular review of the contracts, very few conflicts had been reported on such farm plots.

E. Effect of the Land Use Act on Tenancy Arrangements

The introduction of the national land legislation in 1978 destabilized the previously stable arrangements that had existed between landowners and tenants. Previously, there was a good understanding of, and compliance with, the tenets of customary farmland tenancy by both landowners and tenant farmers. The different interpretations given to the section of the legislation dealing with landowner-tenant relationships under customary rule by many of the judicial officers and court judges led to destabilization.¹⁸ In 1978, the Land Use Act (the "Act") aimed to turn all land users into state tenants by vesting the ownership rights in all lands of any state of the federation in the governor of the state.

Before the introduction of the Act, tributes were paid by tenant farmers to land owners as a *de facto* recognition of their ownership rights. However, with the introduction of the land reform, most tenant farmers within the study area refused to continue the payments of tributes by claiming a new status under the Act, which abolished all forms of customary tenancy. Concerted efforts were made by the landowners to collect the tributes to no avail; the Act seemed to embolden the customary tenants to refuse the payment of tributes required under customary tenancy rules. In 1991, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled that customary landowners were entitled to rent/tribute payments from their customary tenants, temporarily reducing the incidence of farmland disputes as most tenants resumed payments of tributes/rents. However, the reluctance to review the Act or remove the clause abolishing customary

¹⁸ Y.L. Fabiyi & E.O. Idowu, *Land and Tree Tenure in Nigeria*, in POPULATION, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT NEXUS, WORLD BANK STUDY, 54, 99 (May 5, 1993).

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tenancy from the land legislation has continued to generate conflicts between customary tenants and their landlords. Lack of adequate administrative structures and trained personnel, as well as corruption by political office holders (and officials), has continued to rob the legislation of its few areas of potential for stimulating the growth of the Nigerian economy. This corroborates the position of Mortimore and Fabiyi that the Nigerian economy is yet to benefit maximally from the land policy.¹⁹

F. Fixing of Tribute/Rent Payable Under Customary Rules

Landowners dictated the terms of the tenancy agreements in approximately one-third of the cases, while bargaining on the terms by both parties occurred in approximately 35% of the cases (See Table 4). Tenants did not dictate terms in any of the cases. In fact, the rush by migrant farmers in search of suitable lands for cacao production during the 1960s and 1970s enabled landowners (represented by the four extended families that own all the farmlands within the study area) to dictate the terms to migrant farmers concerning the tributes to be paid. The migrant farmers had acquired very good knowledge of cacao production from their respective places of origin where the crop was first introduced, but lacked the farmlands (in both size and quality) required to plant the crop. Hence they migrated to the study area where the soil was suitable for the cultivation of the crop and the population pressure on land was not high at the time.

G. Conflict Generation Under Customary Farmland Tenancy

Particular complex situations do arise when statutory rights are granted in such a way that does not take into account existing customary rights. This was the case with the Nigerian Land Use Act of 1978. The economic justification for the reform, as stated in the Act, was the belief that equitable tenancy conditions would stimulate farming, increase production, and improve cultivation practices, and that only tenants who were assured of a decent standard of living and security of tenure (i.e. secure expectations) would be inclined to make improvements that could positively con-

¹⁹ MORTIMORE & FABIYI, *supra* note 6.

tribute to the overall development of agriculture in the country. Since the Act abolished all forms of customary tenancy by turning all land users (landowners and customary tenants alike) into state tenants, the clash of *de jure* right (existing because of the introduced formal land laws) and *de facto* right (existing because of customary tenure rules) provided the background for land conflict generation in the study area.

The abandonment or erosion of long-accepted and socially recognized rules of access to and use of farmlands for cacao cultivation led to an accumulation of social tension and, later, to serious land conflicts. Refusal by customary tenants to pay tribute and rents to their customary landowners set the stage for the conflict that ensued later. About 70% of the plots still had disputes on them at the time this study began. This led to suspension of tribute payment on the plots (See Table 5). The dispute situation had been going on for many years, but was held at bay for some years before it catalyzed into major conflicts in 1980, 1997, and 2000 as a result of external political interventions, changes in or challenges to leadership structure (e.g., the crowning of a new paramount ruler for the area), and changes in rules and laws (e.g., when one social group sought to force its agenda on others for political purposes or exploitative aims).

The land-based conflicts as reported by Idowu soon escalated into major hostilities, marked by political interests and appearing as ethnic differences.²⁰ In the final analysis, key players shifted decision-making from a rational basis to an emotional or affective one further fueling the hostilities.

H. Past Efforts to Resolve Conflicts under Farmland Tenancy

The government and its agencies (e.g., courts, administrators, police, and politicians) had been playing significant roles in resolving past land-related crises without the involvement of local institutions (e.g., kinship, religious, social networks). Despite the major roles played by local institutions in the initial granting of land rights to the migrants, these local institutions were rarely consulted during conflict resolution by mediators. Since each conflict situation had its own specific characteristics, the result was that signifi-

²⁰ E.O. Idowu, *Ethnicity, Land Rights and Communal Conflicts in Nigeria*, AFRICAN NOTES, 3, 5 (October 2001).

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cant contributions in terms of understanding the nature, scope, and depth of the conflicts were denied the mediators.

Within the study area, four extended families owned all the lands and made the grants directly to individual migrant cacao farmers. Therefore, specific obligations existed between such families and individual farmers. A reasonable percentage of the migrant farmers even took certain secret oaths of allegiance before they were allocated the lands. These arrangements had not been taken into account in all of the previous conflict resolutions.

I. Identified Problem Areas

The damages already done to cacao production in the study area can only be partly remedied for two major reasons. First, the conflicts have sown a permanent seed of disaffection and lack of trust among the parties to the conflicts. Second, the agronomic characteristics of the tree crop that require regular and specialized maintenance operations for optimum production had been adversely affected due to abandonment during the years of the hostilities. Finally, adding to the problem, most plantation owners were either killed or otherwise unable to return.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Modern approaches to conflict resolution place responsibilities and obligations on the state, NGOs, and other international organizations, with little space for community participation and community-driven alternatives. It should be recognized that institutional building is a long and extremely difficult process, and there is need for time, efforts, and an understanding of local land inheritance rather than mere importation of the “best” possible institutions from other parts of the world. Institutions are best based on previous experience and tradition, and not written in the law. The legal field does not guarantee the effectiveness of local institutions and, therefore, the state needs to create favorable conditions for their operation and effectiveness in modern societies.

Over-dramatization of conflicts should be avoided since it weakens local conflict resolution capacities and may even create new sources of conflict. Inadequate management of conflict also entails the risk of underestimating both the seriousness of the con-

flict and the underlying stakes. Disputes should be approached through a first stage in the field to gather opposing views of the conflict. Mediators should seek to collect information from those directly affected by conflicts before arriving at any conclusion. In addition, excessive media coverage and politicization of land issues, which usually hamper proper diagnosis of the causes of conflicts, should be discouraged.

It is recognized that past management of agricultural land conflicts in cacao growing areas of southwestern Nigeria involved various categories of actors or institutions, namely individuals, traditional or local groups, and the state. However, it is highly recommended that the local institutions be empowered, given socio-political recognition, and some level of control over the private and public lands in their area. This is indispensable to their identity and development. The role of the state should be limited to reconciling the different interests at play, including the government objective of making cultivable lands available to people in need. This will require a review of the land legislation, especially the section dealing with customary land tenancy, to enhance agricultural investment and development that benefit the poor.

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TABLE 1: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

Status	% of Respondents
Land Status:	
Own land being cultivated	25.8
Tenant on land being cultivated	74.2
Member of land owning group	23.2
Ever give land to other farmers	16.2
Full-time Farmer	68.7
Ever Been to School	39.4
Married	86.9
Built Personal House in Village of Residence	77.8
More Than 50 Years of Age	65.2
Number of Farm Plots Cultivated:	
Landowners	4 – 6
Migrants	2 – 3
Overall Mean	2.4
Average Farm Size (in Hectares):	
Landowners	2.4
Migrants	3.5
Overall Mean	3.2

TABLE 2: ACCESS TO FARMLANDS

Type of Access	Number of Plots	% of Total Plots
Purchase	46	9.8
Inheritance	199	42.3
Gift	85	18.0
Rent	10	2.1
Sharecropping	8	1.7
Borrow	32	6.8
Pledge	87	18.5
Others	4	0.8
TOTAL	471	100.0

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TABLE 3: LENGTH OF CONTRACT

Length (in years)	Number of Plots	% of Total Plots
0 – 4	6	1.3
5 – 9	0	0
10 and above	6	1.3
Not Specified in Initial Land Agreement	459	97.4
TOTAL	471	100.0

TABLE 4: DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF RENT/TRIBUTE TO BE PAID BY TENANTS

Who Decides	Number of Respondents	% of Respondents
Landowners Only	69	34.9
Tenants Only	0	0
Both Landowners and Tenants	7	3.5
No Response	122	61.6
TOTAL	198	100.0

TABLE 5: PAYMENT OF TRIBUTE/RENT ON LAND

Status of Payment	Number of Plots	% of Total Plots
Tribute/Rent is Currently Being Paid	53	11.3
No Tribute/Rent is Paid	328	69.6
No Response	90	19.1
TOTAL	471	100.0