Volume 1, Number 1
Was "Getting to Yes"(1) Possible at Waco?
Revisiting the Propositions of "Principled Negotiation" in the Context of Barricade Incidents with High-Commitment Groups.
By Ariel M. Sasson
We, the people inside, were aware that negotiators, the people on the outside, did not hold our beliefs. And we could understand and relate to that. You know, we could find it quite understandable. But in our situation I don't believe negotiators or the people outside really appreciated or understood the state of mind of the people inside . . . It was my understanding that if the FBI, or whoever it was controlling the situation outside were open and honest with us, then all of us had an obligation to come out.(2)
-- Graeme Craddock, Branch Davidian and Waco survivor.
For almost every positive concession the negotiators were able to obtain from the Davidians, the tactical team was ordered to counter with a negative response. The government did not trust David Koresh, and the Davidians learned not to trust us.(3)
-- Clint Van Zandt, FBI negotiations coordinator testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Waco,
-- November 1, 1995.
I. INTRODUCTION
For fifty-one days, the standoff between the Branch Davidians and the FBI dominated the news and held America captive.(4) David Koresh had become a household name as the public hungered for information about the obscure thirty-three-year old Bible-quoting Texan and his followers. It all ended on Monday, April 19, 1993. Shortly after 6:00 a.m., two specially equipped tanks began inserting tear gas through the windows of the Mount Carmel compound. Over the next six hours, the operation was stepped up as four Bradley vehicles joined the tanks, firing 40mm canisters of tear gas through the windows. Around mid-morning, one of the tanks was ordered to clear a path through the compound to the main tower so that the other vehicles could insert tear gas in that area. The tank started demolishing a corner of the building, and a portion of the roof collapsed. Very shortly thereafter, smoke was seen coming from the second-story windows and, within minutes, the thin frame building was engulfed in an uncontrollable fire, fanned by the gusting winds.(5) The entire scene was carried live to the world over television satellite. Only nine Davidians escaped the fire. The bodies of most of the women and children were found huddled together in a concrete storage area near the kitchen where they had apparently been trapped by falling debris.(6)
The Waco operation turned out to be one of the most massive and tragic in the history of United States law enforcement. In the initial raid on February 28th by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), four BATF agents were killed and twenty wounded, while six Branch Davidians were fatally shot, and four others wounded.(7) Following the raid, the Branch Davidians inside the rambling Mount Carmel complex numbered approximately one hundred twenty-three persons, including forty-three children. They were heavily armed and solidly behind their leader. On April 19th, when it all came to a fiery end, seventy-four Branch Davidians were dead, including twenty-one children under the age of fourteen.
Six years later, a national debate continues over what lessons, if any, are to be learned from Waco. Thousands of hours of investigations, thousands of pages of books, articles and newspaper accounts, as well as untold numbers of radio and television talk-shows and documentaries have produced little consensus on what might be learned from Waco to prevent a similar tragedy from recurring. Yet, one general proposition can be stated where there is probably universal agreement: The power to destroy is not necessarily the power to persuade.(8) Here then, on this common ground, is where our search begins in order to make sense of the ashes of Waco.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE OTHER PARTY
The starting point in designing a strategy to influence others is to better understand how those we are seeking to influence currently perceive their choices. If we want to change someone's mind, we must ask ourselves, "Where is his mind now?"(9) The answer to this question was critical at Waco. From the first moments of the raid through the entire fifty-one day siege, David Koresh's adamant conviction that "theology really is life and death" defined his approach to the government agents.(10) What the FBI viewed as a complex hostage/barricade rescue situation drawn directly from their strategy manuals, Koresh and the Branch Davidians saw as the beginning of the end of the world.(11) Although there was conversation back and forth between Mount Carmel and the government agents during the prolonged standoff, neither side proved capable of bridging the great gulf between those two very different understandings of the situation. The siege itself was marked by the same frustrating and fruitless clash of opinions that attended assessments of Koresh's character. Whereas the faithful on Mount Carmel accepted him as a teacher, a prophet, and the Lamb of God, his opponents saw him as a hardened, manipulative and paranoid adversary who had no intention of surrendering. Whereas government officials considered the community members hostages,(12) the Branch Davidians saw themselves bound for salvation. Ultimately, the inability of each side to comprehend the other's perceptions led to disastrous consequences.
This paper is not meant to second-guess government officials who had the responsibility to make and implement decisions. Rather, it analyzes the events of Waco through the lens of "principled negotiation" as proposed by Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting To Yes.(13) In the eighteen years since its first publication, the ideas in Getting to Yes have gained considerable attention and acceptance from a broad audience and are frequently cited as starting points for other work.(14) Revisiting some of the major points of Fisher and Ury's book within the context of the events at Waco will, hopefully, stimulate discussion directed at producing a better process for achieving peaceful resolutions to similar standoffs in the future.
III. DO NOT BARGAIN OVER POSITIONS
Three weeks into the standoff, Clint Van Zandt was asked by FBI headquarters to travel to Waco to be the Bureau's negotiations coordinator, replacing the current coordinator who was leaving to deliver a speech overseas.(15) Van Zandt's account of the rapport between the negotiation team and Jeff Jamar, the on-scene commander, underscores the point that positional bargaining often impedes progress in negotiations. As Van Zandt recounts:
. . . we [the negotiators] would ask, "Okay, can we go and work to try to get two or three people out?" and we were told, "I want fifty people out." You'd say, "Well, that's unrealistic. Fifty people are not going to walk out at one time, but we can make a concession that perhaps will get one or two people out," and we were told again, "No, we want fifty people out today or else something negative's going to happen." Well you may as well throw your hands up in the air, because something negative then was going to happen and, as I say, my personal belief, my professional belief, is that we lost any chance of trust we had because of the tactical options that were being executed throughout this time. (16)
The tactical options referred to by Van Zandt were part of the FBI's "stress escalation" program implemented to effect sleep deprivation, isolation, and group fragmentation.(17) Electricity was cut off on March 12th. Loudspeakers broadcasted loud music, Tibetan chants, and the distressing sound of rabbits being slaughtered, at all hours of the night.(18) Floodlights were focused on the building while helicopters constantly flew over at low altitudes. Armored vehicles crushed or removed cars and other property belonging to the Davidians that were outside the compound.(19)
These pressure tactics may have made life in the compound unpleasant for David Koresh, but they also undoubtedly escalated his cost of surrender. It is highly improbable that a dedicated leader who was perceived as a messiah would weaken and tell his followers that he would yield to his enemies rather than endure anymore noise. Moreover, the idea that people expecting the apocalypse would submit to tactical pressure was a judgment that belied the Davidians' past behavior during the initial shootout by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF). (20)
Rather than trying to make it increasingly painful to say "no," the government could have instead focused the Davidians' attention to what would have happened had they said "yes," and made that a reasonably attractive choice.(21) It appears that this course was not followed chiefly because the negotiators were out ranked and out numbered. As a result, those in charge dealt with the situation as if it were familiar to them - as if Koresh were a criminal for whom the threat of force would be a significant deterrent.(22) While such an approach was understandable, what continues to trouble many Americans is the steadfast belief still held by many in law enforcement circles that the outcome at Waco was inevitable. Reading the Department of Justice ("DOJ") report, one cannot help but sense the dominant theme running through the DOJ's evaluation of the entire episode was that no other course of action taken by the government could have substantially changed the outcome. For example, though acknowledging the opinion expressed by several on-site negotiators that "more people might have exited the compound during the stand-off if the negotiation strategy had been followed more rigorously,"(23) former Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Edward Dennis nevertheless asserted,
Despite these conflicts, I am not confident that more members would have left the compound if the negotiating strategy had been followed more rigorously. Even though in hindsight the behavioral assessment of Koresh proved extremely accurate, the most compelling evidence of the resolve of the Davidians to follow Koresh was their willingness to take their own lives and the lives of their children in obedience to Koresh.(24)
The AAG then concludes his sixty-three-page evaluation by stating, "The probability that the FBI could have broken Koresh's hold over his followers through negotiations was extremely low based upon what we have learned following the incident."(25)
Mr. Dennis' inferences are highly questionable. Assuming arguendo that all the Davidians who died at Waco indeed did choose suicide, an assessment still hotly debated, it would have been for the same reason anyone chooses to take his own life -- for lack of a better alternative. In retrospect, contrary to the AAG's suggestion, conflicts that end in suicide do not provide "evidence" that, in retrospect, negotiation was probably pointless. It does suggest, however, that the government's power of persuasion could not produce a more appealing alternative to the other side other than to commit suicide. The challenge in the aftermath of such an incident is to ask ourselves, "What can we do better?"
As a preliminary matter, we should realize that the inability of those inside the compound to envision a choice that might have seemed more palatable than mass suicide was a direct product of both sides becoming completely entrenched in their positions and perceptions of each other. As the FBI became increasingly committed to its position that "everybody must come out," it lost sight of some of its critical underlying concerns, including the safety of the children inside the compound. For their part, the Davidians were determined to understand their situation in light of biblical prophecies and God's will. The FBI's behavior only confirmed the Davidians' belief that the government forces were indeed the modern-day "Babylonians" and that the apocalyptic showdown between "the sons of light and the sons of darkness" was imminent.(26)
What strategies could have been employed that might have refocused the parties on their substantive concerns and away from their hardened positions? What follows are some of the core strategies of principled bargaining as proposed in Getting to Yes that define a straightforward method of negotiation designed to avoid the impasses often reached as a consequence of positional bargaining. The paper will address how each of these points was directly related to the dynamics of the standoff at Waco.
A. Separating the People From the Problem
On Saturday, February 27th, one day before the initial BATF raid, the Waco Tribune-Herald had begun to publish a dramatic front-page series entitled "The Sinful Messiah" which alleged that the Davidians and their leader, David Koresh, were guilty of bizarre sexual practices, child abuse and paramilitary activities.(27) This series, based largely on charges by disaffected former Branch Davidians, painted a grim and bizarre picture of Koresh and his followers, echoing all the stereotypes the public had come to associate with unfamiliar groups or new religious movements pejoratively labeled "cults." The FBI apparently shared and certainly tried to perpetuate the public perception of Koresh, charging that he was a power-mad, sex-crazed "con man" who constantly made up and changed the rules as events unfolded.(28) The following exchange between Graeme Craddock, a Waco survivor, and Senator Paul Simon provides a glimpse into the extent of the damage done to the negotiation process as a result of these characterizations to the media:
MR. CRADDOCK: And people were getting upset, because what was being explained to the public was not really what was happening through the negotiations. And this was making people on the inside rather angry at what was going on. And you -- (inaudible) -- going to hinder the negotiation process as it went along . . . And the thoughts going through my mind at least: Why were they doing this? And at least the only answer that I could see was that they were trying to dehumanize us in order to justify taking some sort of action -- justify to the public what was going on.
SEN. SIMON: We're trying to learn lessons from all these things so that we don't repeat mistakes. You mentioned two or three times what happened in press conferences being a matter of concern to those inside. Is one of the lessons that when we have a press conference, we have to be very, very careful about what is said so you don't aggravate a situation rather that move it toward conciliation?
MR. CRADDOCK: The concern we had in regard to the press conferences is that the government was trying to get the minds of the public right so they could then justify the tactical assault. And we wanted the public to know the real truth . . . [O]ne thing that was going to restrict the FBI and the government from doing something like that is public opinion, the way the public sees things, and that was our only safety that we saw (emphasis added).(29)
Perhaps a more general lesson that can be drawn from the above exchange is this: All people, no matter what their beliefs, at some level, care what others think of them. When a person's beliefs are misinterpreted, misunderstandings arise that reinforce prejudice and lead to reactions that produce vicious counteractions. Ultimately, rational exploration of possible solutions becomes impossible and negotiation fails.(30) Where the conflict is accompanied by intense media coverage, these negative impressions are magnified. The purpose of the game becomes one of scoring points and apportioning blame at the expense of the substantive interests of both parties.(31)
The impulse to treat the "people problem" as inseparable from substantive concerns is even more evident in disputes involving persons with unconventional beliefs and value systems. The strength and sincerity of the convictions of people with unfamiliar beliefs can easily be undervalued and dismissed as a cover for criminal behavior. The fact that a person's actions may be criminal, however, does not diminish the sincerity of his beliefs. At Waco, one of the FBI's primary concerns was that children inside the compound were being subjected to sexual abuse. David Koresh had convinced his followers that only he should have sex with the women and propagate children. He convinced parents on the same religious grounds to permit him to have sex with their teen-age daughters. One specific concern, then, was the possibility of Koresh's continued abuse of these children. However, to the FBI and the vast majority of Americans who viewed such conduct not only as unlawful but also as morally reprehensible, the inclination to equate the problem with David Koresh, the person, was irrepressible.
When deeply rooted values collide, the very suggestion of separating people from the problem would seem to someone embroiled in a conflict as, at best, a hopelessly unattainable ideal. The key, as Fisher and Ury propose, is to tackle the "people problem" head on.(32) Discuss each other's perceptions. Talk with the people on the other side about their emotions. Talk about your own. When dealing with a subject as sensitive as child sexual abuse, discussing perceptions in a frank, honest manner is especially critical. Asking the right questions in a non-judgmental fashion allows negotiators to gather information, which helps them to develop and weigh different options. At Waco, those questions could have included, "Is there any present sexual contact going on with the children? If not, how can we confirm your truthfulness? If so, what could we offer in return for an agreement that such conduct be stopped? How can we make sure the bargain was being upheld?" Instead, sticking to its position that "everyone must come out" and avoiding discussion of emotionally charged issues, the FBI was not communicating its most vital concern.
Admittedly, there is no guarantee that such an approach would have produced a mutually acceptable solution. However, at the very least, it would have led to a better understanding of the Davidians' thinking and refined the FBI's own view of the situation. As things turned out, throughout the fifty-one day siege, the government was left guessing about the children's well being.(33) Had the FBI confirmed the allegations of ongoing sexual abuse, it would now be much more difficult to criticize the ultimate decision to tear-gas the compound as being ill informed.
The religious dimension of the confrontation made the task of separating the people from the problem even more difficult. Nancy Ammerman, a scholar of religious movements, was one of ten experts who was asked by the DOJ to submit recommendations that would assist the FBI in dealing with analogous situations in the future. Specifically, she was asked to comment on how law enforcement agencies should deal with groups whose thought processes or motivations depart substantially from familiar behavior. Many of her observations are well directed, not only to law enforcement officials, but also to anyone involved in a conflict where differences in religious beliefs form part of the controversy. In part, Dr. Ammerman remarked that:
Most of us are accustomed to seeing religion as relevant only to portions of our lives, with wide areas of decision-making (from marriage partners to what we do at work) kept neatly out of the reach of religious authorities. However, throughout much of the world and throughout much of human history, such neat divisions have not been the norm. People have lived in tightly knit communities in which work, family, religion, politics, and leisure (what there was of it) fell under one domain. Taking the long view, not belonging to such a community, is more abnormal than belonging to one. No matter how strange such commitments may seem to the rest of us, they are widely sought by millions of people. A number of social scientists have written accounts of everyday life in such religious groups, and those accounts can help readers understand the sense of coherence and belonging that outweigh, for the believers, any freedom of choice they give up.(34)
Obviously, there are psychologically damaging cults and people whose religious piety is a cloak for some neurosis. However, if the issue of clashing religious beliefs is brushed to the side rather than dealt with directly, the chances of making an informed evaluation are greatly minimized. Waco provides a classic example. The FBI log shows that Koresh became increasingly combative, particularly around the middle of March when, as a result of the decision to step up the pressure tactics, Jamar told the FBI negotiators to "get tough" and not allow any more "Bible babble" from Koresh.(35) In fact, this "Bible babble," as the FBI characterized it, was what Koresh was primarily interested in discussing. For the entire fifty-one days, Koresh expounded on the Bible at length to negotiators, trying to convince them of his prophetic gifts of interpretation. The negotiation transcripts show that much of the time the FBI failed to seriously listen or fully grasp what he was trying to communicate.(36) They were understandably unprepared to deal with someone who used Scripture on such a highly technical level. One of the FBI negotiators admitted that some initially thought the Seven Seals of the Book of Revelation, about which Koresh talked incessantly, were animals.(37)
We are quick to believe that people who surrender authority to their religious leaders over matters that most of us prefer to decide for ourselves are unstable, especially when the religious leaders are outside the mainstream religions. When people begin to sign over wages and property, and leave family and community behind, we often judge them not just as religiously eccentric, which is itself problematic, but as members of a cult. Even within the acceptable mainstream, we seem more comfortable with people whose religions consist of nothing but a few private sessions of worship and prayer, and who are too secularized to let their faiths influence the rest of their week. One scholar has argued, "This attitude exerts pressure to treat religion as a hobby: one does not talk about one's faith if it causes behavior that society considers immoral, such as polygamy . . . At that point, what has already been reduced to the level of hobby becomes even worse: 'subversive of good order.' "(38)
When we disagree with people's religious convictions, we must often reexamine and defend our own beliefs. Such introspection makes most of us feel uncomfortable. We avoid it, hoping the problem will somehow disappear. Negotiators and mediators in such situations are confronted with three distinct challenges: first, overcoming their discomfort and making differences in religious beliefs an integral part of the negotiations; second, resisting the impulse to try to change the other side's beliefs; and, third, and perhaps the greatest challenge, persuading the other side that what you want is reconcilable with their belief system. As will be discussed, in order to meet this final challenge, there are strong arguments in favor of using third-party mediators who are familiar with the other side's belief system.
B. Focus on Interests Not Positions
Interests, as defined by Fisher and Ury are "the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions."(39) Positions are things upon which we have decided. Interests are what caused us to so decide. How do we identify the interests that are involved in a negotiation? One way is to ask, "Why?" and "Why not?" Why, for instance, was it imperative to the FBI commander that at least fifty people come out of the compound at once? Why not forty? Why not everyone? Asking ourselves, "Why?" clarifies our understanding of the needs, hopes, fears and desires that our position serves.
Certainly, at Waco, there were a multitude of needs, hopes and fears. There were the fears spawned by unfamiliar religious beliefs. There were the fears of child abuse. With so much firepower on both sides, there was fear for the safety of those inside and outside the compound, and of nearby residents. Less apparent, but critically important, was the fear of damage to each side's reputation. The FBI, charged with enforcement of our laws, had four dead BATF agents on its hands. How would the American people view the FBI if it could not bring those responsible to justice? For the Davidians, we now know, conveying their version of the events to the American public was equally important. In short, the Waco standoff involved fundamental concerns that motivate all people - security, a sense of belonging, power and recognition.(40)
The most important, "Why not?" that continues to be asked about the events at Waco is, "Why not just have waited it out?" Or as one late-night talk-show host joked during the first days of the stand-off, "Why don't they just put up barbed wire around it and call it the jail at Waco?"(41) This question focuses not only on the government's interests, but also cuts to the heart of the national debate on how those interests should be prioritized. The question forces us to consider what we as a nation want law enforcement's mandate to be in "Waco-like situations." Of course, the answer to that depends on how we perceive "Waco-like situations." On a conceptual level, this debate over priorities reflects the awkward but necessary balance that we in America are trying to strike. On the one hand is a magnificent respect for freedom of conscience, including the freedom of religious belief. On the other hand is our legitimate fear of religious domination over the very laws designed to protect those freedoms.(42) Inevitably, there will be episodes such as Waco where these competing interests will force us to make difficult choices. The first steps in making those decisions are to recognize the competing interests and communicate them effectively. Thinking at such an abstract level may not seem appropriate in the course of "practical negotiations." A truly talented negotiator, however, is able to identify these competing interests and reframe them so that the other side will think, "Yes, this person really understands the things that are important to me."
At Waco, the FBI decided that doing nothing for an indefinite period of time was not an acceptable alternative to a negotiated agreement, or in Getting to Yes terms, an acceptable BATNA.(43) The following testimony sheds some light on the considerations that led the FBI to believe it was compelled to act:
MR. VAN ZANDT: [O]ne of the suggestions we had was . . . let's put barbed wire around that place, let's back off, let's bring in the Marshals or somebody in, and set that place up as a prison. Now the flip side of that a -- because I talked to Jeff Jamar -- (inaudible) -- and he said, Well, what's the flip side? And I said the flip side is that four months from now David Koresh is going to stand up at the window, and he's going to hold this little -- he's going to hold this little emaciated baby up in front of the window and say, see, FBI, this baby is dying, and if you don't give us what we want this baby is going to die. Now, we'll leave it up to you. And I think that's what we would have continued to face from David.
MR. SMERICK: And if he didn't do that, my concern as a profiler was he had a video camera within that compound, and there was nothing to prevent him from sitting there in front of the camera with two young girls on his lap -- 8 -- or 9-year olds -- and announce to the FBI and the world that "God has decreed that I can have sex with these two young women." And where was the FBI? Initially my thought . . . was, yes, let's turn this into a prison camp . . . But by the same token, if he would have threatened to abuse the children, I think we would have been obligated to do something as an agency. I don't think the American people would have allowed us to sit still and allow this travesty to occur. And with David's philosophy of wanting to have the end come at some particular point, I believe we would have been provoked into doing something . . . The final outcome was going to be the same.
What emerges from this testimony is that the FBI pursued its tactical option not in response to a realization of its worse fears, but rather in anticipation of them. As Fisher and Ury remark, suspicious interpretation often follows naturally from one'sexisting perceptions.(44) Moreover, it seems the "safe" thing to do. However, in a negotiation, the cost of deducing the other side's intentions from your fears is that fresh ideas in the direction of agreement are spurned, and possible options are rejected. To acknowledge that David Koresh would have eventually forced the government's hand is also to acknowledge that the government still had options. By deciding on the tear gas option primarily on the perceptions of what Koresh "would have" or "could have" done, the government closed the door on all other options. This point may seem overly simplistic to experienced negotiators. However, it is still worth reminding ourselves from time to time that the whole point of negotiating is to realize our aspirations instead of realizing our fears. If we concede from the beginning that what we fear most is already destined to occur, then there is no purpose to negotiation. Premature judgment stifles imagination(45) and creative problem-solving.
C. Inventing Options for Mutual Gain - Use of Third Party Mediators
Bargaining situations in which parties are aware of the value that each places on an outcome are "negotiations of complete information." When parties are unaware of one another's interests, negotiations are conducted under incomplete information. In game theory terms, these situations are referred to as symmetric and asymmetric games with respect to information exchange.(46) The assumption here is that the more the parties know about one another, the higher their mutual gain.
In light of this hypothesis, what a student of game theory might find particularly intriguing about Waco are the complaints of several negotiators who described their situation as "information overload." One agent even referred to the threat of "fax meltdown."(47) Yet, virtually every expert whose opinion was sought by the DOJ recommended gathering even more information and a broader pool of expert consultants. In fact, relying on those recommendations, the Deputy Attorney General proposed the establishment of a pool of on-call behavioral science experts and the creation of an information database about hostage/barricade situations worldwide.(48)
While these proposals are commendable, they overlook a critical point. For information to be useful in generating options, it must first be organized and presented to negotiators in a manner that makes it easy to evaluate. The answer to "information overload" is not more information but, rather, as Fisher and Ury propose, having a facilitator who can stimulate discussion, record all ideas and keep them in full view.(49) In high-intensity conflicts, it is difficult for government negotiators not only to listen attentively to what the other side is saying but, also, to keep track of the myriad ideas that are being presented to them.
Whether such a facilitator should assume an active part in the process as a third-party mediator is still controversial. Historically, the official FBI position has been that third-party mediators are usually considered counterproductive to the negotiation process. However, recent events, including the standoff between the FBI and the Montana Freemen, indicate a radical departure from this position.(50)
One of the impaneled experts, Lawrence E. Sullivan, Director of the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University, made several observations. He highlighted cases where third parties, who shared the religious convictions of those barricaded but sought the peaceful end of the siege through surrender, had succeeded where agents had failed.(51) These cases also departed from the norm of avoiding the controversial subjects of religion and politics during negotiations. In view of his previous experiences with "unconventional" groups, Dr. Sullivan recommended that federal law enforcement rethink their negotiating norms in favor of finding individuals who share the groups' conventions.(52) The following statement of Waco survivor Graeme Craddock bolsters Sullivan's recommendation:
And so one of the reasons why I think he -- you know, we wanted to stick with negotiators that had some sort of religious background is so that you could relate to someone . . . It's just the process of being able to talk to someone that . . . understands. You get a feeling of relief, you get a feeling of well-being towards the person you have related it to . . . and this is the reason why I think it was . . . an advantage for someone with a religious background similar to the experiences which a lot of us grew up in.(53)
Another panelist, Dr. Alan Stone, Professor of Psychiatry and Law at Harvard University, has recommended a "red light" approach to third party mediators.(54) The red light should go on when the commander on the ground begins to feel that negotiations are at a standstill.(55) Dr. Stone concluded that "[i]t was a significant omission at Waco not to involve as a third-party negotiator/intermediary a person of religious stature familiar with the unconventional belief system of the Branch Davidians."(56)
Dr. Stone's report also addressed the problem of information overload, but from a different perspective. He remarked that the prevailing pattern of information flow during the crisis was for each expert to offer an opinion independently to the FBI.(57) Dr. Stone stated that, as a preliminary matter, it was important for the FBI to establish who the relevant experts were and then arrange some form of communication for sustained dialogue among them, "to understand and clarify the dimensions of their disagreements and, when possible, to achieve consensus."(58) In essence, "differences must be confronted within the circle of consultants; they should not vanish in the information overload."(59)
IV. CONCLUSION
As the authors of Getting to Yes recognize, there is nothing startlingly new about the concepts in "principled negotiation" that we did not already know at some level of our own experience. However, as the events at Waco illustrate, applying what we know intuitively does not always come naturally. It is not easy to change habits, separate emotions from the merits, or enlist the help of others to work out a wise solution to a shared problem. By becoming aware of these ideas and applying them consciously, we learn from our mistakes and improve our negotiating skills. Perhaps the most important thing we need to remind ourselves is that what we are trying to accomplish is a better way to resolve differences -- a way that avoids having to choose getting the results we want at the expense of being decent. The grief, suffering and public outcry caused by the American tragedy of Waco should strengthen our resolve that we can and must have both.
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